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I.

INTRODUCTION

HE PURPOSE of the Warsaw Convention' is two-fold-to
establish a uniform manner to regulate the conditions of
international air transportation and to limit the liability of air
carriers in the event of an accident.2 Despite a desire for uniformity, courts have not been uniform in awarding damages
under the Warsaw Convention for emotional injury. While the
Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs may not recover for pure
psychic injury under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,3 the
question of whether a plaintiff may recover for something other
* B.S., Pennsylvania State University, 1984; M.A., University of Maryland, 1988;
J.D., University of Maryland, 1996, with honors; Recipient of the American
Jurisprudence Award for Excellence in Evidence; Order of the Coif; Assistant
Editor, Maryland Law Review. Mr. Easton is a partner in the Houston office of
Pillsbury Winthrop LLP. Mr. Easton has a general litigation practice, with an
emphasis on products liability defense, oil and gas disputes, and aviation-related
matters. He is a former U.S. Air Force F-16 and commercial airline pilot.
** B.S., Chemistry, Wheaton College, 1995, cum laude,J.D., University of Notre
Dame, 1998; Associate Articles Editor, Journal of Legislation; National Moot Court
Team. Ms. Trock is an associate in the Washington, D.C. office of Pillsbury
Winthrop LLP.
*** B.S., West Texas State University, 1992, cum laude, M.A., University of New
Mexico, 1995; J.D., The University of Texas School of Law, 2000, with honors.
Mr. Radford is an associate in the Houston office of Pillsbury Winthrop LLP.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention or Convention].
2 Id. at Preamble, 49 Stat. at 3014.
3 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1991) ("We conclude that an air
carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a
passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of injury.").
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than pure psychic injury has resulted in a wide range of opinions, some allowing no recovery at all and others allowing full
recovery in certain circumstances. Far from being uniform, the
outcome in those cases often depends upon how a plaintiff categorizes her injuries and the strength of the scientific or medical
evidence offered in support of the plaintiffs claims. This paper
provides a summary and analysis of that case law.
II.

THE WARSAW CONVENTION FRAMEWORK

The Warsaw Convention traces its origins back to the 1925
First Conference on Private Air Law in Paris (the "Paris Convention") and the 1929 Second International Conference on Private Air Law held in Warsaw.4 A resolution was adopted at the
Paris Convention to establish the Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Ariens ("CITEJA"). 5 The CITEJA
was compromised of air law experts, with the stated purpose of
"provid[ing] a continuous study of the problems involved in private liability resulting from the international operation of aircraft and to producing a codification of the law incident
thereto."6
Four years after the Paris Convention - when civil aviation was
still in its infancy and international air service was even less developed - a second international conference was held in Warsaw. The United States sent an observer to the conference, but
did not participate in the negotiations. Mindful of the expansion of the infant civil aviation industry, the conference had two
primary purposes, which were later embodied in the Warsaw
Convention. The first goal was to establish uniformity in documentation and claims arising out of air transportation among
air carriers serving different countries.7 The second and more
important goal was to limit air carrier liability.8 When transmitting the Warsaw Convention to the United States Senate in
1934, then Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, wrote:
4 Andres F. Lowenfeld & Allan Mendelsohn, The United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497, 498 (1967).
5 CITEJA later dissolved, and its functions have been taken over by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which was created by the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, openedfor signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
6 Overview: Private InternationalLaw, Av. L. Rep. (CCH)
24,021 (Oct. 1999).
7 See Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 498-99.
8 Id. at 499.
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It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a more
definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litigation, but
that it will prove to be an aid in the development of nternational
air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a
more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance
rates, with the probable result that there would eventually be a
reduction of operating expense for the carrier and advantages to
travelers and shippers in the way of reduced transportation
charges. 9
The Convention entered into force on February 13, 1933 and
was adopted and entered into force in the United States on October 29, 1934.0

times,"

The Convention has been amended several

and most recently, in September 2003, the United

States' ratification of the Montreal Convention of

199912

will

once again change the legal landscape for air carrier liability in
cases involving international air travel. Effective November 4,
2003, the Montreal Convention raised the liability cap previously
in effect under the Warsaw Convention and added as a fifth potential jurisdiction the passenger's place of residence. It did
not, however, alter the basic requirements for recovering for injury under the Convention.' 3
The liability structure of the Warsaw Convention is fairly
straightforward. Article 17 sets forth the circumstances under
which a plaintiff may seek damages arising out of an accident."
Articles 20, 22, and 25 relate to limits on liability and available
defenses to a claim. 1 5 All claims arising during international air
" See id. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Message from the President
of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 73-G, 3-4 (1934).
1o See Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at Proclamation of President
Roosevelt, 49 Stat. at 3013.
1" For a discussion of amendments to the Warsaw Convention, see J. Brent
Alldredge, Comment, Continuing Questions in Aviation Liability Law: Should Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention Be Construed to Encompass Physical Manifestations of Emotional and Mental Distress?, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1345 (2002).
12 See Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensation for Accident Victims Set to Enter
Into Force (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/nr/
pio200314.htm.
13

Id.

14 Warsav Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018. The text of
Article 17 is set forth, infra section 11(A).
15 Article 20 provides:
(1) The Carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or
that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures; (2) In
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travel must be brought under the Warsaw Convention, and if no
such claim can be brought under the Convention, no claim can
be brought at all.' 6 Article 29 of the Convention imposes a twoyear statute of limitations in which to bring a claim.' 7

the transportation of goods and baggage the carrier shall not be
liable if he proves that the damage was occasioned by an error in
piloting, in the handling of the aircraft, or in navigation and that,
in all other respects, he and his agents have taken all necessary
measure to avoid the damage.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 20, 49 Stat. at 3019. Article 22 provides:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier
for each passenger shall be limited to the sum of 125,200 francs.
Where, in accordance with the law of the court to which the case is
submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments shall not
exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability. (2)
In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram,
unless the consignor has made, at the time package was handed
over to the carrier, a special declaration of the value at delivery and
has paid a supplementary sum if the case so requires. In that case
the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the declared
sum, unless he proves that that sum is greater than the actual value
to the consignor at delivery. (3) As regards objects of which the
passenger takes charge himself the liability of the carrier is limited
to 5,000 francs per passenger. (4) The sums mentioned above shall
be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national currency in round figures.
Id. at art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019. Article 25 provides:
(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the
damage is caused by his willful misconduct or by such default on his
part as, in accordance with the law of the court to which this case is
submitted, is considered to be equivalent to willful misconduct. (2)
Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said
provisions, if the damage is caused under the same circumstances
by any agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his
employment.
Id. at art. 25, 49 Stat. at 3020.
16 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168-69 (1999).
17 "The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought
within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the
date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 29, 49 Stat. at
3021.
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The purpose of the Warsaw Convention and the limitations of
liability contained in Article 17 and Article 22 ' 8 were "designed
to assure that only a regulated burden be borne by the air carriers and to afford a more definite basis for passenger recovery."' 9
The Convention's limitation on liability made it easier for air
carriers to obtain insurance and financial backing from investors, while the recovery provisions also provided some relief for
passenger victims and their families.2 °
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention states in the original
French:
Le transporteurest responsable du dommage survenu en cas de mort, de
blessure ou de toute autre Msion corporelle subie par un voyageur lorsque
l'accident qui a cause le dommage s'est produit d bord de l'agronefou au
2
cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de dlbarquement. '

The English translation, as ratified by Congress in 1934, reads as
follows:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of
the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
18 Article 22 limited liability to 125,200 Poincar6 (gold) francs, which was approximately $8300 (U.S.) at the time. Id. at art. 22, 49 Stat. at 3019. The Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague
Protocol, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680, reprintedat 49 U.S.C. App. § 1502
note (1976) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement] raised the limit to $75,000 and
allowed for negotiation between carriers and passengers for higher limits. The
Montreal Agreement was strictly contractual - it did not have the force of law of a
treaty. On September 5, 2003, the United States delivered its ratification of the
1999 Montreal Convention to the ICAO. As the 30th country to ratify the Montreal Convention, the Convention will take effect in 60 days, on November 4,
2003. The Montreal Convention raises the liability cap to approximately
$135,000 with no limits on recoveries above that amount for proven damages. See
Montreal Convention of 1999 on Compensationfor Accident Victins Set to Enter Into Force
(Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://icao.org/cgi/goto.pl?icao/en/nr/pio200314.
htm.
19Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 385, 396 (N.Y. 1974) (citing
Eck v.United Arab Airlines, 203 N.E.2d 640 (N.Y. 1964) and letter of Secretary of
State Cordell Hull dated March 31, 1934, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Convention for the Unificiation of Certain Rules, SEN. EXEC. Doc. No. 73-G, 3-4 (1934)).
20 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 4, at 499-500.
21 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3005 (emphasis added). On its face, there appears to be very little substantive or contextual difference with respect to the use of the word "accident" in the new Convention as
compared to the Warsaw Convention. Accordingly, case law interpreting the
meaning of "accident" as used in Article 17, should have the same precedential
value under the new Convention.
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suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage
so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.2 2
B.

TREATY HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION

Treaty Construction

1.

When interpreting a treaty, courts begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.2 3
Courts use the authentic language text of the treaty to guide
their analysis2 4 and consider the "legal meaning" of the terms
used in the treaty for guidance as to the shared expectations of
the parties. 25 Where the original text of the treaty is written in
one language only, the text of the treaty in that language is
controlling.2 6
One way in which courts may ascertain the legal meaning of a
particular term is to consider a proper translation of that term
into their own language. 27 Courts, however, recognize that dictionary definitions may be too general for purposes of treaty interpretation.2 8 Courts turn, in such cases, to the legal materials
of the country in whose language the treaty was written to determine whether that country's contemporary legal understanding
and application of a particular term differed from the term's
translated meaning. 29 Where the meaning of a treaty is ambiguous, courts will look beyond the written words to the history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties:3 As the Supreme Court explained in
Zichermnan v. Korean Air Lines Co., because "a treaty ratified by the
United States is not only the law of this land .... but also [it is]
an agreement among sovereign powers, we have traditionally
considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiating and draftId. at art. 17, 49 Stat. at 3018 (emphasis added) (English translation of Article 17).
23 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988).
24 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397-99 (1985).
25 Id. at 399.
26 See Todok v.Union State Bank of Harvard, 281 U.S. 449, 454 (1930).
22

27
28

Saks, 470 U.S. at 399.
Floyd, 499 U.S. at 537.

Id.
'0 Saks, 470 U.S. at 396; see also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259 (1984) (referring to "travaux preparatoires"of the Warsaw
Convention to determine its meaning); Maugnie v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 549 F.2d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1977); Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines, Ltd.,
2 All E.R. 696 (H.L. 1980).
29
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ing history (travaux preparatories)and the post-ratification understanding of the contracting parties."' Finally, a fundamental
principle of treaty construction is that treaties should receive a
liberal interpretation to give effect to their apparent purpose.12
2.

Negotiating and Drafting History

Although the negotiating history of the Warsaw and Montreal
Conventions offers no definitive guidance on what, if any,
psychic injuries should be compensable under the Convention,
it does suggest that the drafters of both conventions did not intend that purely emotional injury be compensable. 33 First, the
treaty that became the Warsaw Convention was drafted at an international conference in Paris in 1925.11 The final protocol of
the Paris Conference contained an article specifying that: "The
carrier is liable for accidents, losses, breakdowns, and delays. 3 5
Such "expansive provision, broadly holding carriers liable in the
event of an accident," is believed to "almost certainly have permitted recovery for all types of injuries, including emotional distress."36 In revising the Paris protocol for the Warsaw
Convention, the CITEJA revised this language and introduced
the phrase "en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre lesion

corporelle." 7 This language was ultimately adopted by the Warsaw Convention in Article 17.3 Although there is no definitive
evidence explaining why the CITEJA drafters chose this narrower language, it is reasonable to infer that the Conference
adopted the narrower language to limit the types of recoverable
injuries.39
Second, although there is no evidence that the drafters or signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically considered liability for psychic injury or the meaning of "lesion corporelle," it is
reasonable to assume that the signatories had no specific intent
to include purely psychic injury in the Convention because compensation for such injury was unavailable in many common law
31 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines, 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996).

Todok, 281 U.S. at 453.
Foyd, 499 U.S. at 544-45.
34 Saks, 470 U.S. at 401.
35 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 542.
36 Id. (quoting Sisk, Recovey for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Convention:
The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Lgsion Corporelle, 25 TEXAS INT'L
L.J. 127, 142 (1990)).
37 Id. at 543.
32

33

38 Id.

39 Id.
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and civil law countries at the time of the Warsaw Conference.'
Finally, early drafts of the Montreal Convention's Article 17 expressly included liability for mental injury, included the term
"personal injury," and even introduced the element of personal
injury designed to encompass both physical and mental injuries. 4 1 However, after deliberations, the ICAO removed both
"mental injury" and "personal injury" from the provision, choosing, instead to retain the original Warsaw Convention
language.4 2
In sum, historical legal context of the Warsaw Convention as
well as the changes made in the course of Warsaw and Montreal
Convention draft revisions seem to indicate that purely emotional injury was not meant to be compensable under the Convention. However, the negotiating history offers no guidance
for determining whether emotional injury damages can be recoverable when they are preceded, accompanied, or followed by
a physical injury.
III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PSYCHIC AND
PHYSICAL INJURY

Previously recognized distinctions between purely psychic and
physical injuries have become somewhat blurred, as the scientific and medical understanding of purely psychic injuries has
evolved. For example, physical manifestations of post traumatic
stress disorder ("PTSD") are reported to include: "neurobiological alterations in both the central and autonomic nervous systems, such as altered brainwave activity, decreased volume of the
hippocampus, and abnormal activation of amygdala, ... hyperarousal of the sympathetic nervous system, increased sensitivity
of the startle reflex,... sleep abnormalities .... abnormal levels
of key hormones," impact on thyroid function, and increased
likelihood of co-occurring psychiatric disorders..4 ' The symptoms of PTSD may also include headaches, gastrointestinal complaints, immune system problems, dizziness, chest pain and
discomfort.4 4

41

Id. at 544.
Alldredge, supra note 11, at 1369-70.

42

Id.

40

43 National Center for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, What is Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, available at www.ncptsd.org/facts/general/fs-what-is-ptsd.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
44 ld.
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In recent cases construing Article 17, plaintiffs have offered
evidence that PTSD itself constitutes physical injury, citing new
technology that allows doctors "to perceive that extreme stress,
such as a near-death experience or being taken hostage, can actually change brain cell structure and cause a specific area of the
brain to atrophy.

' 45

As medical technology continues to ad-

vance, it is likely that plaintiffs will be able to claim physical injury for injuries such as PTSD and other injuries that have
traditionally been classified as "purely psychic" or "emotional injuries." As plaintiffs' claims become more technologically sophisticated, the meaning of the term "lsion corporelle" will
continue to evolve.
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF "LESION CORPORELLE"
UNITED STATES COURTS: BODILY INJURY ON
THE CONTINUUM

1.

Recovery for Pure Emotional Injury Unaccompanied by Physical
Injury or Physical Manifestation of Injury

Prior to the SupremeCourt's decision in Floyd,46 courts were
split as to whether a plaintiff could recover for pure psychic injuries. In one of the earlier cases, Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,

Inc.,4 7 New York's highest court considered the claims of passengers involved in the hijacking of a flight from Tel Aviv to New
York. The claims were brought under Article 17 for emotional
injury accompanied by physical injury. The plane was hijacked

on September 6, 1970, and plaintiffs were held hostage for six
days by guerillas armed with rifles and hand grenades. Plaintiffs
claimed that they suffered "severe psychic trauma" and that they
were damaged "by the physical circumstances of their imprisonment aboard the aircraft."48 Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that
they suffered physical injury as a result of the forced immobility,
inadequate sanitary facilities, and scarcity of food and water.
The alleged physical injuries included backache, swollen feet,
boils, skin irritation, weight loss, dehydration, and sleep deprivation.49 The defendant airline argued that the liability scheme of
the Warsaw Convention did not allow recovery because physic
injury, "with or without palpable physical manifestation," is not
45 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
46 F/oyd, 499 U.S. at 530.
47 Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).
48

Id. at 850.

41)

Id.
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"bodily injury" within the meaning of Article 17, and that "the
physical injuries claimed did not result from any impact and in
any case are so slight as not to amount to compensable 'bodily
injury.'" 5 0
The court began by examining the meaning of Article 17 in
its original French and found that there was no dispute that the
words "mort, de blessure, ou de toutes autres lMsion corporelle" were

properly translated as "death or wounding or any other bodily
injury. "5 1 For purposes of the plaintiffs' claims, the meaning of
"bodily injury" was at issue. The court acknowledged that the
French legal usage of the term lesion corporelle should be considered, but declined to apply French law to determine the meaning of the term.52 The first step in the court's analysis was to
its
determine whether "the treaty's use of the word 'bodily,' 5in
3
ordinary meaning, can fairly be said to include 'mental."'
The court found that the ordinary meaning of the term "bodily injury" connotes "palpable, conspicuous physical injury, and
excludes mental injury with no observable 'bodily,' as distinguished form 'behavioral,' manifestations.

'54

Given the plain

meaning of the term, the court concluded that "the compensable injuries must be 'bodily' but there may be an intermediate
causal link which -is the 'mental' between the cause - the 'accident' - and the effect - the bodily injury. '5 5 Once the causal
link is established, the court reasoned, damages sustained as a
result of the 'bodily injury' - whether mental or physical - are
compensable under the Warsaw Convention. 56 The court found

that the airline was liable for the palpable, objective bodily injuries, "including those caused by the psychic trauma of the hijacking," and for the damages caused by them, but not "for the
trauma as such or for57 the non-bodily or behavioral manifestations of that trauma.
On the other hand, in Floyd v. EasternAirlines, Inc.,58 the Court

of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the phrase "l9sion
corporelld' in the authentic French text of Article 17 encom50

Id. at 852.

51 Id.
52 Id.
53

Id. at 855.

54 Id.

55 Id. at
56 Id.

857.

57 Id.
58

Floyd v. E. Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989).
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Similarly, a host of trial
passed purely emotional distress.
courts interpreted the Convention to permit damages for purely
emotional injury.6
Although the Supreme Court had decided cases under the
Warsaw Convention several times before,61 it was not until its
review of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Floyd v. Eastern Airlines,62 that the Court established the framework for the recovery
of emotional injuries under the Warsaw Convention. The case
was brought by passengers of an Eastern Airlines flight from
Miami to the Bahamas. Shortly after takeoff, one of the engines
lost oil pressure and, as part of the normal emergency protocol,
the flight crew shut down the engine and returned to Miami.
The two remaining engines then failed, and the flight crew informed the passengers that the plane would be "ditched" in the
Atlantic Ocean. As the plane was descending, the crew was able
to restart one of the engines and the plane landed safely at
Miami International Airport.63 The passengers brought suit to
recover damages solely for their mental distress. The district
court concluded that pure psychic injury was not compensable
under the Warsaw Convention.64 The Eleventh Circuit reversed,
holding that the phrase "Msion corporelle" encompassed "purely
emotional distress.

'6 5

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to

resolve the conflict between the Eleventh Circuit and the New
York Court of Appeals decision in Rosman v. Trans World Air-

lines.6 6 The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, ultimately holding that recovery for pure psychic injury was not
permitted under the Warsaw Convention.
The Court applied long-accepted methods of treaty interpretation, considering the text of the treaty, its context, as well as
the "history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical con59 Id. at 1471.
60 See Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1251
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322
(C.D. Cal. 1975).
61 See El A] Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 160 (1999); Zicherman
v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 218 (1996); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392 (1985).
62 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 533 (1991).

63 Id.
64 In re E. Airlines, Inc., Engine Failure, Miami Int'l Airport on May 5, 1983,
629 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
65 F/oyd, 872 F.2d at 1480.
66 See Rosman, 314 N.E.2d at 850 (holding that purely psychic trauma is not
compensable under Article 17); see also discussion, supra section IV(A) (1).
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struction
text, the
when an
been an

adopted: by the parties. "' Beginning with the French
Court set forth the three part test for determining
air carrier is liable for passenger injury: "(1) there has
accident, in which (2) the passenger suffered 'mort,'

'blessure,' 'ou . . .toute autre lesion corporelle,' and (3) the accident

took place on board the aircraft or 'in the course of operations
of embarking or disembarking.'"

61

The narrow issue reviewed

by the Supreme Court was whether mental or psychic injury
alone satisfies the requirements of condition two - in other
words, did the passenger suffer "lesion corporelle."' 9
The Court examined the French text and its English translation. French dictionaries, the English translation of the treaty as
ratified by Congress, and the United Kingdom's translation of
the term all define the term "lsion corporelle' as "bodily injury.""
In the absence of disagreement as to its proper English translation, the Supreme Court next turned to the French legal interpretation of the text. The Court applied the same principles
that would have been applied by contemporary French lawyers
to interpret the text - "(1) legislation, (2) judicial decisions, and
(3) scholarly writing. ' 71 The Court found that the term "lesion
corporelld' was not in use in French legislative texts at the time of
the Warsaw Convention.72 Second, the Court found no French
court decisions explaining the meaning of the phrase. Third,
the Court found no supplemental materials or scholarly writing
prior to the Convention discussing the meaning of the term "/sion corporelle.''73 Since neither Article 17 nor the traditional
methods of interpretation suggested that the term "lesion
corporelle" should be translated as anything but "bodily injury,"
the Court then examined the negotiating history of the
Convention.
The protocol established by the Paris Convention in 1925
would have held air carriers liable for a broad range of injuries,
67 Floyd, 499 U.S. at 552.
68

Id. at 535-36.

69 Id.

Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 537.
72 More recent French cases have used the term "Msion corporelle," generally, in
the context of automobile accidents. Id. at 538. The Court found that the recent
cases "tend to support the conclusion that, in French legal usage, the term "lMsion
corporelle" refers only to physical injuries." Id. at 538.
73 Although some scholarly writings discussed "ldsion corporelle" subsequent to
the Convention, the Court found the analysis unpersuasive. Id.
70

71
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including emotional distress.74 At the Warsaw Convention,
CITEJA drafted the more narrow provision that was ultimately
adopted, although the negotiating history does not provide an
explanation as to why the language was revised or of the meaning of the term "lesion corporelle." The Floyd Court's review of the
documentary record "confirms - and courts and commentators
appear universally to agree - that there is no evidence that the
drafters or signatories of the Warsaw Convention specifically
considered liability for psychic injury or the meaning of 'lesion
corporelle.'-

75

The Court was persuaded by the "unavailability of

compensation for purely psychic injury in many common and
civil law countries at the time of-the Warsaw Convention.

'76

"On

balance, the evidence of the post-1929 'conduct' and interpretations of the signatories ... supports the narrow translation of
'lsion corporelle.' ,,77 After examining subsequent amendments to

the Convention as well as case law from other Signatory States,
the Court concluded that there was no support for a broader
reading of the term. The Court ultimately held that "an air carrier cannot be held liable under Article 17 when an accident has
not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury or physical manifestation of injury," but expressed "no view as to
whether passengers can recover for mental injuries that are accompanied by physical injuries. "78
In cases subsequent to Floyd, courts have consistently found
that pure emotional distress is not actionable. In Fishman v.
DeltaAir Lines, Inc., plaintiffs-an infant child and her motherbrought an action against an airline for damages sustained by
the infant when a stewardess applied a cup containing a warm
cloth over the child's ear to alleviate the child's pain from
changes in air pressure.79 When the stewardess applied this to
the child's ear, scalding water dripped onto the child, causing
burns s° The crew declined to administer first aid upon arrival,
and eventually, the child was rushed to the first aid station at the
airport and was treated. The court's primary focus was whether
74 Id. at 542 (referencing Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw
Convention: The Elusive Searchfor French Legal Meaning of Ldsion Corporelle, 25 TEX.
INT'L LJ. 127, 142 (1990)).
75 Id. at 544.
76 Id. at 544-45.
77 Id. at 546 (internal citations omitted).
78 Id. at 552.
79 Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1998).
80

Id.
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the alleged torts arose from an "accident" under the Warsaw
Convention and whether the statute of limitations was tolled
during the child's infancy. Relying on the Supreme Court's Decision in Air France v. Saks,81 the court found that the claim fell
within the scope of the meaning of accident as the injury was
caused "'by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that
is external to the passenger.'" 8 2 The court went on to find that
injuries resulting from "routine procedures in the operation of
an aircraft or airline can be an 'accident' if those procedures or
operations are carried out in an unreasonable manner. "83
In an attempt to bring her claim outside of the Warsaw Convention, the child's mother argued that her claims were solely
for emotional harm and, therefore, outside the scope of Article
17.84 Because the claim arose out of an accident, it was within
the ambit of Article 17. In fact, the court found that all claims
for both infant and mother were accident claims under the Warsaw Convention.85 However, because the mother's claims were
solely for emotional distress they were not compensable under
the Warsaw Convention.
In Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.,86 an individual brought a putative class action under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention 87 on
behalf of himself and other similarly situated passengers on a
flight from New York to London.88 The flight was delayed and
eventually cancelled, and the plaintiff alleged a variety of "inconveniences" under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention arising from the delay. The inconveniences he suffered included:
"(1) having to remain in the holding area without adequate
food, water, restroom facilities and information; (2) having to
stay in a substandard motel; (3) having to 'be subjected' to misinformation about the flight status; (4) having to obtain alternative means of transportation; and (5) losing out on a refreshing,
memorable vacation." 89 While acknowledging that economic
damages arising from delay were compensable under Article 19
Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
Fishman, 132 F.3d at 141 (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 405).
83 Id. at 143 (emphasis in original).
84 Id. at 142.
85 Id.
86 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 301CVl179P, 2002 WL 1461920, at *3
(N.D. Tex. 2002).
87 See id. Article 19 provides that "the carrier is liable for damage occasioned
by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, luggage, or goods."
88 Lee, 2003 WL 1461920, at *1, 2.
81

82

89

Id. at *3 fn. 5.
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of the Warsaw Convention,"° the court found that the plaintiffs
alleged damages were nothing more than pure mental injuries
arising "from discomfort, annoyance, and irritation" suffered as
a result of the delay."' As such, the Lee court relied on Floyd and
Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd.,9 2 and concluded that plaintiff could not recover for mental injuries under the Warsaw
Convention.93
In another Article 17 case, Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Services,
Inc.,94 the court reviewed a claim for emotional distress resulting
from a passenger coming into contact with biomedical waste in
an air sickness bag that was allegedly left from a prior flight.
The plaintiff also alleged emotional distress from the fear of
contracting a disease from the waste. Plaintiff alleged no bodily
rejected the plaintiffs arguments as having
injury, and the court
95
no basis in law.

90 Id. at *4. "Because the Warsaw Convention is premised upon a 'contract'
between the passenger and the airline, courts permit recovery of economic damages arising out of the delay itself (i.e., rental, hotel accommodation, taxis, etc.)
under Article 19." See Pakistan Arts & Entm't Corp. v. Pakistan Int'l Airlines
Corp., 660 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
9'

Lee, 2002 WL 146920, at *5.

Daniel v. Virgin Atlantic Ainvays Ltd., 59 F. Supp. 2d 986, 992-93 (N.D. Cal.
1998) (dismissing claims of emotional distress including anxiety, exhaustion,
frustration, humiliation, mental anguish and physical discomfort arising out of a
flight delay).
93 Lee, 2002 WL 146920, at *5. Under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention,
courts have allowed recovery for inconvenience as a result of delay. See Daniel, 59
F. Supp. 2d at 994 ("[D]amages for inconvenience do not fall within the rubric of
'emotional distress.' Time is money, after all, and the Court finds that the inconvenience of being trapped for hours in an unfamiliar airport is a compensable
element of damages for delay in air travel under the Warsaw Convention and
domestic law, even in the absence of economic loss or physical injury."); see also
PakistanArts & Entm't Corp., 232 A.D.2d at 32 (holding that "[d] amages resulting
from the delay in transporting a passenger are the type permitted to be recovered
under the Convention"); Harpalani v. Air India, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (holding that Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention provided a cause of
action for delay where plaintiffs were "bumped" from their scheduled flight and
the airline did not provide transportation for six days).
Notably, the cases that have rejected recovery under Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention for pure emotional injury arising from delay have relied on Floyd,
which denied recovery under Article 17 of the Convention based on the meaning
of "Msion corporelle," a term that is not used in Article 19.
94 Croucher v. Worldwide Flight Servs., Inc., 111 F. Supp. 2d 501, 502 (D.NJ.
2000).
92

95 Id. at 507.

680
2.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Emotional Injury Manifested in PhysicalInjury

Although the Supreme Court has never decided whether
emotional injury that manifests itself in physical injury is compensable under Article 17, lower federal courts have generally
agreed that, like pure emotional injury, emotional injury that
manifests itself in physical injury is not compensable under Article 17. For instance, in Hermano v. United Airlines, the plaintiff
brought an action for unlawful arrest, defamation, and negligent infliction of severe emotional distress.9 6 The plaintiff
checked several bags-some of which contained motorcycle
parts-on a flight from Los Angeles to Miami with a connecting
flight to Brazil. While on board the aircraft, the plaintiff was
approached by a uniformed airline employee and questioned
about whether he had any firearms in his checked bags. After
denying the claim, the plaintiff was asked to deplane the aircraft, which he did. After the bags were re-examined and no
firearms were found, the airline employee located another flight
for the plaintiff and the rest of his trip proceeded without further incident. Plaintiff sought damages for "severe and enduring mental distress and anguish, emotional shock to his nervous
system, and monetary expenditures for medical treatment."9 7
Relying on Floyd and Tseng, the court found that plaintiff's
"physical manifestations of alleged emotional distress" were insufficient to constitute bodily injury under the Convention.9"
Similarly, in Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., a passenger sought damages for extreme emotional distress, post
traumatic stress disorder, and anorexia. 9 During her flight to
London, the captain became aware of a bomb threat against the
plane; it was classified as a "nonspecific warning which could be
related to one or more targets but where there could be doubt
as to its credibility or the effectiveness of existing security measures.""" In accordance with the airline's protocol, the captain
informed the passengers of the threat, and the plane landed
safely as scheduled in London.''
96 Hermano v. United Airlines, No. C 99-0105SI, 1999 WL 1269187, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. 1999).
97 Id. at *4.
98 Id.
,., Terrafranca v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd., 151 F.3d 108, 109 (3d Cir.

1998).
loo Id. at 108.
101
d. at 109.
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There was no dispute that the event constituted an "accident"
under Article 17, and the only question was whether plaintiffs
injuries were compensable under the Convention. 1 1 2 The plaintiff relied on a sentence at the very end of the Floyd opinion,
which states: "We conclude that an air carrier cannot be held
liable under Article 17 when an accident has not caused a passenger to suffer death, physical injury, or physical manifestation of
. . " 103
znjury.
In light of the last phrase, "physical manifestation of injury,"
the plaintiff asserted that her injuries were compensable under
the Convention. 10 4 Rather than claim that PTSD was the physical
manifestation of injury, the plaintiff relied on her weight loss as
the actual physical manifestation of the injury. The Terrafranca
court rejected the plaintiffs argument, relying on the central
holding of Floyd - that a passenger cannot recover absent bodily
injury. 1 5 The court concluded that the text of Article 17 requires "bodily injury" as "a precondition to recovery" and that
the plaintiff "must demonstrate direct, concrete, bodily injury as
opposed to mere manifestation of fear or anxiety." 106 Since the
plaintiffs claims of post traumatic stress disorder complicated
by anorexia and weight loss were found to be purely psychic,
they did not qualify as "bodily injuries" under Article 17.107
In Turturro v. Continental Airlines,""8 a plaintiff's pocketbook
was stolen prior to boarding a flight to Costa Rica. The pocketbook contained plaintiffs medication, Xanax, which plaintiff
regularly took to treat panic attacks, anxiety, and nervousness.
Plaintiff boarded the aircraft, but became concerned that the
medication would wear off during the flight, and asked the
flight attendant if she could disembark. The flight attendant denied her request, despite the fact that they had not yet pushed
back from the gate. After her third request was denied, plaintiff
began to feel terrified. She started to sweat and as alleged, began to "feel dizzy, nauseated, and short of breath." She had a
rapid heartbeat and pain in her stomach."0 9 The plaintiff dialed
Id. at 110.
Foyd, 499 U.S. at 552 (emphasis added).
104 Id.
105 Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 111.
106 Id. Plaintiff s psychiatrist classified plaintiffs injuries-fear, anxiety and isolation-as emotional. Id. at 112.
102
103

107

Id.

108 Turturro v. Continental Airlines, 128 F. Supp. 2d 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
100sId. at 173.
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"911" from her cell phone and eventually the police contacted
the pilot and the aircraft returned to the gate. An airline employee "announced over the loudspeaker that an 'unruly' passenger wished to leave; some fellow passengers then greeted
plaintiff with hisses and jeers.""'
The plane returned to the
gate, and the plaintiff disembarked, where she was treated by
EMS technicians and transported to a nearby psychiatric emergency room."1
Plaintiff claimed she suffered "embarrassment, humiliation,
loss of liberty, psychological injury, pain, suffering emotional
distress and mental anguish."' 1 2 She also claimed that she suffered post traumatic stress, psychological injury and pain, and
that she continued to suffer physical manifestations"'3 after her
release from the hospital, including "insomnia, restlessness, inability to concentrate, and unexplained aching in her arms and
4
'1

legs."'

The court reasoned that, in Floyd, although not expressly alleged, many of the plaintiffs suffered what "we may call 'psychosomatic' sequelae (such as insomnia or weight loss) as a result of
their acute fear while airborne."'" 5 The court reasoned that
Floyd bars recovery for "physical manifestations" of emotional
distress where the accident causes "no direct physical injury but
rather merely terrifies the passengers (even when the terror
later leads to physical symptoms, such as weight loss).""' 6 The
court determined that this reading is bolstered by the Supreme
Court's narrow reading of lesion corporelle, which respected the
Convention's primary purpose of limiting the liability of air carriers and maintaining uniformity.1' 7 The court held that to "the
extent that plaintiff throughout her ordeal did not receive any
physical wounds, impacts, or deprivations, or any alteration in
the structure of an internal organ, then any subsequent shortness of breath, sleeplessness, or inability to concentrate may
110 Id.
1
112

Id.

Id. at 174.

113Evidence of plaintiffs diagnosis by her psychiatrist was confusing, as she
made two different diagnoses - acute stress disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, each with different manifestations. Id.
114

Id.

115 Id.

at 175.
116Id. at 177.
117Id. (citing Floyd, 499 U.S. at 547).
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safely be characterized
as psychosomatic and is not
1
18
compensable."
The Turturrocourt also considered sua sponte whether the accident caused the plaintiff to develop PTSD. In its review, the
court acknowledged new medical advances that make it possible
to document the physical effects of PTSD, including changes to
brain cell structure, and "that under some circumstances a diagnosis of chronic PTSD may fall within the Convention's definition of 'bodily injury.' "119 While ultimately concluding that the
plaintiff did not adequately plead PTSD, as she did not proffer
"reliable evidence beyond her purely subjective experience of
' 2
panic, . .. somatic complaints, ... and conflicting diagnoses,"' 1
the court's conclusion may represent a significant development
in the ability of plaintiffs to recover for PTSD under Article 17.
The court recognized that its finding might open the "floodgates of litigation" unless claims of PTSD are carefully
1 21
scrutinized.
In more recent cases, plaintiffs have begun bringing claims
that PTSD is tantamount to physical injury, based on new medical technologies that suggest that injuries traditionally considered "purely psychic" or "purely emotional" parallel
physiological manifestations. In Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines,
plaintiffs alleged that they suffered emotional injuries and physical manifestations of emotional trauma during a flight through
severe turbulence related to a hurricane. 2 2 Plaintiffs generally
alleged that PTSD, like other stress-related disorders, "causes 'biochemical and structural changes' in the brain."'1 23 The court
divided the alleged injuries into several categories, none of
which were compensable under Article 17. First, several injuries
were "patently and purely emotional" and, as such, they were
non-compensable under Floyd's construction of Article 17.124
The second category of injury included "manifestations of emotional injury-either physical (nausea, cold sweats) or mental
(nightmares, lack of concentration).' 20 The court found that
these claims were expressly precluded by Terrafranca,which re'iS Id. at 178.
119 Id. at 179.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Bobian v. CSA Czech Airlines, 232 F. Supp. 2d 319 (D.NJ. 2002).
123 Id. at 322.
124 Id. at 325.
125

fd.
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quired direct, concrete, bodily injury. While evidence was offered to suggest that severe turbulence could directly cause
physical symptoms such as nausea and cold sweats, plaintiffs did
not allege that such symptoms were a direct result of the severe
turbulence encountered by the aircraft. Plaintiffs also alleged
that the mere experience of G-forces amounted to bodily injury
under the Convention. The court rejected this argument, noting that "while such forces may of course cause injury, 12exper6
iencing them does not in itself constitute bodily injury."
The Bobian court also declined to apply the reasoning in Turturro, instead relying on Terrafrancaand concluding that PTSD is
purely an emotional injury, despite plaintiffs' attempt to re-characterize PTSD in terms of its effect on the brain. However, unlike Terrafrancawhere the plaintiff did not allege physical injury
from her PTSD, in Bobian, the plaintiffs presented evidence that
PTSD and other stress-related disorders are associated with biochemical and structural changes in the brain. 127 The plaintiffs
in Bobian presented general evidence that PTSD and other emotional disorders are tantamount to physical injuries, but they did
not present specific evidence such as MRIs or other medical evidence of their particular injuries. Other lower courts presented
with such evidence have allowed the actions to proceed.
For example, in Weaver v. Delta Airlines,128 the District Court
for the District of Montana awarded damages to a plaintiff
whose emotional injury resulted in a simultaneous brain injury. 12 In Weaver, the defendant airline made an emergency
landing during a flight from London. The plaintiff alleged that
she was terrified during the emergency landing and had to subsequently seek treatment for emotional and physical injuries attributable to the accident. 3 ' She was subsequently diagnosed
with PTSD. 31 The plaintiff argued that recent developments in
medicine have determined that "extreme stress causes actual
physical brain damage, i.e., physical destruction or atrophy of
portions of the hippocampus of the brain."' 3 2 Plaintiff also
presented evidence sufficient to meet her burden of showing
"an absence of any factual issue that the emergency landing
126

Id. at 326.

127 Id.
128
129

130

Weaver v. Delta Airlines, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (D. Mont. 1999).
Id.
1d. at 1190-91.

131 Id.
132

Id. at 1191.
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physically impacted" her brain, while the defendant did not
raise a genuine issue that the plaintiffs injury was non-physical. 133 As such, no material issue of fact existed and the court
focused on whether the plaintiff was entitled to ajudgment as a
matter of law." 4 The Weaver court concluded that, because
plaintiffs PTSD manifested as a brain injury, she sustained a
bodily injury within the meaning of Article 17.135 Cognizant, as
was the Turturro court, that its decision could open the "floodgates of litigation," the court reasoned that because claims must
be based on a "definite diagnosis of a disorder that arises from a
physical injury that is medically verifiable," there would be no
flood of litigation arising out of its holding.'3 6
In Carey v. United Airlines,137 the Ninth Circuit distinguished
Weaver. In Carey, a passenger brought a claim against an airline
arising out of a confrontation with a flight attendant. The passenger was seated in first class, while his three daughters were
seated in coach. During the flight, two of his daughters experienced ear aches and attempted to seek their father's assistance
in first class. A flight attendant prevented them from reaching
their father. The father alleged that the flight attendant refused
to assist him and humiliated him in front of the other first-class
passengers.' 3 8 The passenger alleged emotional and mental distress and claimed that he suffered "physical manifestation including nausea, cramps, perspiration, nervousness, tension and
sleeplessness."' 3 9 The lower court concluded that the passenger's sole remedy was under the Warsaw Convention and that
the alleged injuries were not compensable. This is consistent
with the holding in Weaver and Chendrimada v. Air India,"' although the lower court in Carey did not require medical evidence of "physical injury" of the emotional injury in order to
sustain the action.
On appeal, the Carey court affirmed the Third Circuit's reasoning in Terrafrancathat the physical manifestations of the passenger's emotional distress and mental distress - nausea,
133
134
135

Id. at 1192.
Id.
Id.

136 Id.

137 Carey v. United Airlines, 255 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2001).
138

Id. at 1046.

139 Id.
140 Chendrimada

v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); see infra sections IV(A) (2), (A) (3).
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perspiration, cramps, nervousness, tension and sleeplessness did not satisfy the Article 17 "bodily injury" requirement.14 1 As
in Terrafranca,the passenger did not demonstrate "'direct, concrete bodily injury as opposed to mere manifestation of fear or
anxiety.'- 142 The Carey court relied on the reasoning in Floyd
with respect to the purpose of the Convention, i.e., to limit the
liability of air carriers to foster industry growth. 4 ' The court
also referenced dicta in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng'44 to
support its conclusion that the "Supreme Court would hold that
physical manifestations purely descended from emotional and
mental distress do not satisfy the 'bodily injury' requirement of
Article 17."' 45 Although other cases, including Terrafranca,cite
to this same statement in Tseng, the issue of recovery for emotional distress was not before the Tseng Court. 146 Again, as the
plaintiffs did not provide concrete physiological medical evidence of their emotional injuries, the court was hard pressed to
find that the emotional injuries constituted "bodily injury"
under Article 17.
In Bloom v. Alaska Airlines,147 the Ninth Circuit reviewed a passenger's claim with facts very similar to those in Carey. The passenger brought a claim for emotional distress under Article 17
based on his confrontation with a flight attendant. The plaintiff
did not allege bodily harm, but alleged that intentional infliction of emotional distress "is not preempted because the Convention does not govern the commission of intentional and
malicious torts that cause non-bodily harm."14 8 The court analogized this case to Carey and held that the "Warsaw Convention
creates 'no exception for an injury suffered as a result of intentional conduct.'"

14 9

As the injuries were purely emotional, the

passenger's claim was barred.

141
142

Id.
Carey, 255 F.3d at 1052 (citing Terrafranca, 151 F.3d at 110).

143 Id.

at 1052-53.

El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
145 Carey, 255 F.3d at 1053.

144

146

Tseng, 525 U.S. at 172.

Bloom v. Alaska Airlines, No. 01-55684, 2002 WL 1136727 (9th Cir. May 30,
2002) (unpublished opinion).
147

148 Id.
149

at *2.

Id. (citing Carey, 255 F.3d at 1051).
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Emotional Injury Unrelated to Physical Harm

The majority of courts have not allowed plaintiffs to recover
for emotional injury that is unrelated to physical harm. In Alvarez v. American Airlines, Inc.,150 plaintiff sought compensation for
physical and mental injuries related to an emergency evacuation. Plaintiff suffered physical injuries during the evacuation,
including bruises and pain. In addition, plaintiff began having
anxiety attacks in situations that were similar to those occurring
just before the evacuation. 151 The plaintiff did not allege a casual connection between the physical injuries and the mental injuries. The court concluded that only plaintiffs physical injuries
were compensable.
The Alvarez court adopted the majority view that in order to
recover for psychological injuries, there must be a "causal link
between the alleged physical injury and the alleged psychological injury.' 1 52 The court looked to the Second Circuit's decision
in Shah v. Pan American World Services, Inc.153 and compared the
language in Article 25, which required causation, with the liability provisions in Article 17, which did not. The court found that
"under Article 17, a relatively intimate link is required between
the liability-triggering event (the accident) and plaintiffs' damages because the liability-triggering event is not necessarily culpable."'1 54 In other words, whereas a liability event is necessary
to trigger liability under Article 25 (which is necessarily culpable), Article 17 imposes strict liability for "bodily injury," and the
standard for imposing strict liability should be more stringent.
Contrasting a similar case, Longo v. Air France, Inc.,' 5 5 where
the plaintiffs alleged bodily injuries (bruises during evacuation)
and related emotional injuries (fear of death), but failed to allege that their fear of death flowed from their bruises, the Alvarez court concluded that:
The Convention's goal of 'reasonable and predicable' recoveries,
would be undermined if similarly situated passengers were
treated differently from one another on the basis of an arbitrary
and insignificant difference in their experience. The happenstance of getting scratched on the way down the evacuation
slide . . . [should] not enable one passenger to obtain a substan150

Alvarez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 1999 WL 691922 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).

15,
152

Id. at *1.
Id. at *4.

153

Shah v. Pan Am. World Servs., Inc., 148 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 1998).

154

Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *4.

155

Longo v. Air France, Inc., 1996 WL 866124 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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tially greater recovery than that of an unscratched co-passenger
who was equally terrified by the plane crash. In sum, in a case
governed by Article 17, a plaintiff may recover compensation for
psychological and emotional injuries only to the extent that
these injuries are proximately caused by his or her physical injuacries. Psychological and emotional injuries that are merely
56
companied by physical injuries are not compensable.1
The court found no such link in Alvarez.
Not all courts have so hastily granted summary judgment in
cases where psychic injury accompanies physical injury. In In re
Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana,15 7 actions were brought
against airlines for pre-impact fear damages arising out of an air
crash in which all passengers perished. In allowing damages for
pre-impact fear, the court emphasized what Floyd did not address-the question of whether passengers could recover for
mental injuries that were accompanied by physical injuries and
the decision that "there could never be any recovery for purely
psychic injuries." 158 The court pointed out that nothing in Floyd
"states that once [the bodily injury] precondition is met, and
physical injury or death is present, damages for mental distress
are not available."'1 59 The court distinguished other lower court
decisions that have extended Floyd to "create a partial bar to recovering for emotional distress under the Warsaw Convention. '""'
In these cases, courts found that the "emotional
distress claims flowing from the accident (as opposed to some
16
physical injury sustained in the accident) are unrecoverable."' '
The Alvarez court declined to adopt the reasoning in these cases,
where "Article 17 itself expressly requires a causal link only between 'damage sustained' and the accident." 6' 2 In holding that
plaintiffs could recover for their pre-impact pain and suffering,
the court in In re Roselawn noted that its decision, "which permits those passengers who sustained physical injury in the accident to recover for any pre-impact terror they may have
experienced, is no more unfair than the rule recognized in
Alvarez, 1999 WVL 691922, at *5 (citations omitted).
In re Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Indiana, 954 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. Il.
1997).
156

157

158Id.

at 178.

161

Id.
Id.
Id.

162

Id. at 179.

159
16-
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Floyd, which permits only passengers with physical injuries to recover at all."' 3
Similarly, in In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1,
1983,164 the court granted damages for emotional injury that
was accompanied but not caused by simultaneous physical injury. Survivors sought damages for pre-death pain and suffering
by passengers on a Korean Air Lines flight that crashed after
being shot down by a Soviet missile. 6 5 The court found that
passengers were alive and conscious for about eleven minutes
after the initial missile strike." 6' Acknowledging that, under
Floyd,'6 7damages for mental anguish were not recoverable "absent physical injury,"' 6 the court awarded damages for the dece-

dents' mental anguish because the evidence showed that they
did sustain physical injury due to rapid air decompression. 69
According to the court, the facts that the emotional injury was
"accompanied by physical injury" and that the decedents' suffering was "likely considerable" made the case "vastly different"
from Floyd. 7 0
In Chendrimada v. Air India,171 plaintiffs brought an action for
injuries that occurred on a trip to Bombay, India. Plaintiffs' first
flight from New York was canceled due to a bomb scare, and
plaintiffs were rescheduled on a flight the following day. 7 2 The
flight made a scheduled stop in Delhi, but due to weather conditions, the flight remained at Delhi for eleven and a half hours,
during which plaintiffs were not allowed to deplane nor were
they provided with any food. Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered
"bodily injuries" by being confined without food for that period
- including nausea, severe cramps, pain and anguish, malnutrition and mental injury.' 73 The court found that the plaintiffs'
allegations of bodily injury satisfied the requirements of Floyd to
survive summary judgment-namely that they alleged a "physiId.
In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 814 F. Supp. 592 (E.D.
Mich. 1993).
165 Id. at 594.
166 Id. at 598.
167 F/yd, 499 U.S. at 530.
16" In
re Korean Air Lines Disaster,814 F. Supp. at 598.
169 Id.
163

164

170

Id.

171

Chendrimada v. Air India, 802 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Id. at 1090.
Id. at 1092.

172
173
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cal injury or manifestation of a physical injury."' 7 4 The court
concluded that the manifestation of physical injury "need not
result from a suddenly inflicted trauma, but may, as is alleged
here, result from other causes for which the carrier is responsible.11 7 5 The court's conclusion, while consistent with the deci-

sion in Weaver, relaxes the requirement that the emotional
injury be related to physical injury.
Emotional Injury "FlowingFrom" Physical Harm

4.

In cases following the Floyd decision, most courts have found
that recovery for emotional injuries is permitted so long as the
emotional injury "flows from" the bodily injury. In In re Inflight
Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching Athens,
Greece on April 2, 1986,176 ("TWA"), survivors brought an action
against an airline for physical and psychic injury arising out of a
bomb explosion in which four people were killed and others
were injured. One of the passengers alleged physical and
psychic injuries. Mr. Ospina, a passenger, seated directly over
the bomb, was blown out of the plane. Expert testimony established that Mr. Ospina's body had been nearly severed by the
blast and that he probably lived for five to ten seconds after the
blast and was aware of what was happening to him.
'
and beThe court focused on the term "dommage survenue"177
gan by acknowledging that while the term encompasses many
forms of harm, it cannot include "purely mental injury unconnected to physical harm. '' 178 The TWA court found that the

Floyd decision implied that "psychic damage accompanying physical injury is recoverable."' 79 The court distinguished Floyd
based on the type of mental suffering experienced. In Floyd, the
passengers were terrified, but no one was physically harmed
from the event, while the airline's misconduct1 80 in TWA caused
plaintiffs to suffer "while in pain from his wounds, falling to certain death after the bomb tore through his body as he was
174

Id. (emphasis added).

175

Id.

In re Inflight Explosion on Trans World Airlines, Inc. Aircraft Approaching
Athens, Greece on Apr. 2, 1986, 778 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds sub nor., Ospina v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 975 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
177Translated in English as "damage sustained." Id. at 640.
178 Id. at 637.
179 Id.
180TWA's failure to follow established security protocol was found to be willful
misconduct by the jury. As such, the liability limits of Article 17 did not apply.
See id. at 638.
176
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Because Mr. Ospina suffered bodejected from the aircraft."''
the court found
ily injury that then caused him psychic harm,
l 2
the award of damages to be appropriate.
The court recognized that some courts18 3 have objected to
permitting recovery for pain and suffering subsequent to physical injury because any de minimus physical injury, such as a
scratch or bruise, could give rise to recovery for psychic trauma.
The court reasoned that in this case, the psychic injuries arose
directly from the bodily injury, and both types of injury were
severe. As such, the court distinguished the case from ones
where the passenger first experienced psychic injury followed by
bodily injury or death, and ones where death occurred simultaneously with the psychic injury. In upholding the jury's award
of damages for the conscious pain and suffering between the
time of the explosions and Mr. Ospina's death, the court found:
[S]urvival damages for pain and suffering comports with the
main policy goals of general tort law-full deterrence and compensation-without interfering with the goals of the Warsaw
Convention. These goals are compatible-in fact, almost identical. Both are designed to provide full compensation for harm
suffered and deterrence when the statutory limit of $75,000 does
not apply[.] 18"
In Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 8 5 plaintiffs aboard a flight
from New York to San Francisco experienced an "aborted takeoff, crash and fire." All passengers survived, but many suffered
minor physical injuries and were traumatized. Several passengers had international tickets, and their sole remedy was
through the Warsaw Convention. Roughly half of the plaintiffs
alleged only emotional injuries, while the other plaintiffs alleged emotional distress in addition to minor physical injuries.18 6 The court defined "physical manifestations" as "those
bodily injuries or illnesses (such as skin rashes and heart attacks)
that result from the distress one experiences during or after an
accident," and emotional distress as "psychic trauma that one
experiences either during or after the accident... (e.g., fear of
flying or claustrophobia... or embarrassment about disfigureId.
Id.
183 See Alvarez, 1999 WL 691922, at *5.
184 TWA, 778 F. Supp. at 641.
185 Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F. Supp. 654 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
186 Id. at 663.
181

182
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ment or concern that an injury will develop complications)."'

7

The court found that the failure of the Warsaw Convention to
use the term "caused by" in Article 17 may indicate that the recoverable damages "need not be caused by the bodily injury,
and may instead be those caused by the accident."' 8 The court
examined four possible approaches under Article 17 for recovery of emotional distress, ranging from no recovery to recovery
for different types of emotional distress.
First, the court examined the approach that would allow no
recovery for emotional distress, even if accompanied by bodily
injury. The court found this approach consistent with the Supreme Court's narrow reading of "bodily injury" in Floyd.189 This
approach, the court noted, would further the pro-industry
objectives of the Convention. The court ultimately rejected this
approach as too one-sided in favor of the airlines, and concluded that such an approach would not be true to the intent of
the Convention, which sought to balance the interests of the
passengers and the air carriers. 1 °
The second approach discussed by the court was to allow recovery for all distress, as long as bodily injury occurs, regardless
of the causal connection. This approach, favored by plaintiffs,
would be consistent with a broad reading of Article 17 and
would highlight the absence of the phrase "caused by" in Article
17.' 9' The court also rejected this approach, finding that it
would create a separate cause of action for emotional distress,
and would be inconsistent with the courts' rulings "that the Warsaw Convention creates a cause of action, not just a limit on
remedies."' 92
The third approach examined by the court was whether "emotional distress should be allowed as damages for bodily injuries,
but distress may include distress about the accident."' 9 3 Under
this scenario, the emotional distress need not be related to the
injury, except that it must "occur at the same time or later than
the bodily injury."1 94 This approach would preclude recovery
117

Id. at 664.

lI8 Id. at 665.
18

Id.

190 Id.

191 Contrast "damage sustained in the event of... bodily injury" with "damage
caused by ... bodily injury" in Article 17. Id. at 666.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194

Id.
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for pre-impact or pre-injury fear. Although some courts have
adopted this approach, the Jack court found this approach unpersuasive, but provided very little reasoning for its position, citof
ing only the lack of usefulness in analogizing to other 1areas
95
federal common law for recovery of emotional distress.
The final approach, the one the Jack court adopted, is to allow
recovery for emotional distress only to the extent that it flows
from the bodily injury. 9 6 This approach is consistent with the
approach enumerated by the court in Rosman'97 that once bodily injury is established, damages sustained by the bodily injury,
including mental suffering, are compensable. The court found
that this approach would prevent inequities between two similarly situated passengers where both had suffered emotional distress, but one received a minor physical injury and the other
received none at all. Under the fourth approach, neither would
be able to recover for emotional distress, assuming that the minor injury did not, in and of itself, result in emotional distress.
The court acknowledged that its approach would prevent recovery for pre-crash or pre-injury terror, but adopted it as the most
consistent with the intent of the Warsaw Convention.198
In a more recent case, In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 99
the Eighth Circuit reviewed a jury verdict in favor of passenger

damages in the amount of $6.5 million 2 11 for a claim arising
under the Warsaw Convention. The passenger suffered physical
injury (punctured leg, tradumatic quadriceps tendinitis) during
an air crash in Little Rock, Arkansas.2 1 ' Nearly a year later, she
sought treatment from a psychiatrist for her psychic harm. She
was diagnosed with PTSD and depression, and her psychiatrist
testified that her leg injuries were a factor in her PTSD and depression, although later admitted that the passenger would
likely have suffered from PTSD regardless of the physical injury.
While testimony was offered that PTSD causes physical injury to
195

Id. at 667.

196

Id.

197 Rosman, 314 N.E.2d 848 (N.Y. 1974).

198 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 668.
199 In re Air Crash at Little Rock, Arkansas, 291 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 2002).
200 International Air Transport Association ("IATA") inter-carrier agreements
entered into by America made the action a contract, rather than tort action. The
agreements serve to waive the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. So, while the
action was brought under Article 17, the liability limits of Article 17 were not
applicable, hence the large jury verdict. Id. at 506-07 fn. 2.
201 Although the passenger was on a domestic flight, she was returning home
from a trip to Germany. Id. at 506.
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the brain, no testimony was offered to show damage to the passenger's brain. Indeed, no diagnostic medical tests were performed. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that any physical injury is sufficient to trigger recovery of emotional damages, regardless of their cause, and followed what it termed the more "mainstream" view that
"damages for mental injury must proximately flow from physical
injuries caused by the accident. ' 21 2 The Fifth Circuit found that
the approach was "consistent with Floyd, yet provides full compensation for the victim within the bounds established by the
Warsaw Convention. '"203
In its holding, the court drew a line between the emotional
injuries that were directly caused by the passenger's physical injuries to her legs and those that were directly caused by the accident-the damages were compensable in the first case, but not
in the second.2 " 4 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Octo-

ber of

2002.205

B.

INTERNATIONAL CASES

While the United States is the primary source of aviation law
decisions under the Warsaw Convention, 20 6 few other countries
have addressed the issue of recovery for purely emotional damages under the Warsaw Convention. Those countries that have
addressed the issue almost uniformly adopted the view that no
such recovery is available.
In King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd.,2 ° 7 the House of Lords dealt
with two cases where passengers suffered psychiatric injury with
no physical injury as a result of accidents on board aircraft. In
the first case, 20 8 plaintiff King was a passenger on a helicopter
transporting workers off of a North Sea oil platform. Both of
the helicopter's engines failed suddenly, causing the aircraft to
plunge thirty-five feet back onto the oilrig's deck. 20 9 King suffered post traumatic stress disorder with symptoms such as insomnia, nightmares, anxiety, and a fear of flying. He claimed
the accident also caused or contributed to an existing peptic ul202 Id. at 510.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205

206
207
208

209

at 511-12.
537 U.S. 974 (2002).

King v. Bristow Helicopters, Ltd., 1 Lloyd's Rep. 745, 746 (H.L. 2002).
Id. at 745.
Id. (citing King v. Bristow, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 95 (2001)).
Id.
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cer. In the second case, ° the plaintiff was an underage girl,
Morris, traveling unaccompanied from Kuala Lumpur to Amsterdam, who was sexually assaulted by a male passenger sitting
next to her. She presented evidence at trial that she suffered
from clinical depression consisting of a single episode of a major
2 11
depressive illness. She claimed only mental anguish damages.
The House of Lords heard a consolidated appeal because the
2 12
same legal issue was presented in both cases.
The House of Lords held that compensation could be
awarded for physical manifestations of a mental injury so long as
a casual link can be established by showing that the mental injury causing the physical symptoms itself was caused by the accident. 21 3 However, no recovery is available for mental injury
absent physical symptoms. 2 14 In this consolidated appeal, the
holding meant that plaintiff King could recover only for his ul2 15
cer, and plaintiff Morris was entirely denied recovery.
In their analysis, their Lordships turned to the leading authorities from the United States. In particular, they followed Eastern
217
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd2 16 and El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,
218
Lord
but paid close attention Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc.
folnot
for
rationale
legal
any
to
Steyn noted that, in addition
was
Weaver
following
lowing Weaver, the policy reason for not
that "the extension of the Warsaw system to include mental injury and illnesses is too controversial to command sufficient international support. '2 ' 9 This rationale for rejecting Weaver is
important in that their Lordships expressed a strong preference
in establishing international uniformity in Warsaw Convention
interpretation. 22' Lord Hobhouse disagreed and thought
Weaver was correctly decided and naturally followed from
Floyd.22 1 Lord Hope took a third position. He suggested that
bodily injury is that which is capable of being demonstrated by a
physical examination using the most sophisticated means availa-

211

Id. (citing Morris v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Q.B. 100 (C.A. 2002)).
Id. at 746.

212

Id. at 747.

210

213
214
215
216
217
218

Id.
Id.
Id.
Hoyd, 499 U.S. at 530; see supra note 62 and related analysis.
Tseng, 525 U.S. at 155; see supra note 137 and related analysis.
Weaver, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1190; see supra note 122 and related analysis.

220

King, 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 755.
Id. at 748.

221

Id. at 783-84.

219
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ble. 2 He then stated that he did not think such an examination happened in Weaver and, in fact, that no evidence of a
physical injury had been presented at all in that case. 22 1 Based

on these differing viewpoints, the United Kingdom's position regarding Weaver is unclear.
The House of Lords had been previously confronted with the
issue of damages for purely mental injuries in Sidhu v. British
Aiorways. 224 That case involved a consolidated appeal arising
from passengers being taken hostage in Kuwait by invading
Iraqis during the first Gulf War. The plaintiffs claimed to have
suffered psychological and bodily injury including weight loss,
eczema and excessive menstrual bleeding.2 25 In the trial, however, plaintiffs submitted that their claims likely did not fall into
the category of "bodily injury" as their claims were for psychological injury. Before the House of Lords, plaintiffs suggested
that psychological injury should provide for recovery. 226 Their
Lordships regarded the issue as not germane to their decision
and avoided discussion of the issue.227 Interestingly, it appears
that the type of physical injury claimed in Sidhu would have allowed for recovery under the standard set forth by the House of
Lords in King.
Australia has also had the opportunity to decide whether recovery should be allowed for purely mental damages. In Kotsambasis v. SingaporeAirlines, Ltd.,228 the Court of Appeal of New
South Wales dealt with a plaintiff who claimed mental anguish
arising from an in-flight turn-back after an engine fire. 229 Following Floyd, the court held that the term "bodily injury" did not
include purely psychological injury, but noted that the decision
in Floyd "left open the possibility that recovery be available
where psychological injury is accompanied by physical injury. ' 230
The only case supporting recovery for mental anguish without
physical symptoms was handed down by the Israel Supreme
222

Id. at 771.

223

Id.

224

225

Sidhu v. British Airways, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76 (1997).
Id. at 77. The other consolidated plaintiff alleged only psychological injury.

226

Id. at 80.

Id. The issue was whether damage suffered in the course of international
carriage by air is governed exclusively by the Warsaw Convention. The House of
Lords held that it was and dismissed the case on limitations grounds. See Sidhu, 2
Lloyd's Rep. at 87.
228 Kotsambasis v. Singapore Airlines, Ltd., 140 F.L.R. 318 (1997).
229 Id. at 319.
2 0 Id. at 323.
227
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Court. 3 ' In Daddon, the Israel Supreme Court was confronted
with claims by passengers alleging mental anguish damages suffered while being held captive by hijackers.232 The court
reached the conclusion that mental anguish absent any physical
injury should be considered "bodily injury" under the Warsaw
Convention because at the time of drafting, unlike today,
mental anguish either was not actionable or the possibility of
mental anguish without physical harm had simply not been contemplated.233 This approach has been criticized as impermissibly seeking to develop the meaning of the phrase "bodily injury"
by judicial policy in light of subsequent legal and medical advances instead of interpreting the Convention as written. 2 34 To

date, no other jurisdictions have followed Daddon.235
V.

CONCLUSION

While there is very little disagreement about the literal translation of "lesion corporelle," its meaning and application in the
context of a variety of mental or psychic injuries is less clear.
There is widespread disagreement about whether - and to what
extent - the term encompasses emotional injury. Court decisions since Floyd allow recovery for a range of claims involving
emotional injury under Article 17; in some cases there is no recovery, while in others there is full recovery, depending on the
allegations and the nexus between the alleged injury and any
related or accompanying physical injury. Courts are in agreement that pure emotional injury is not compensable under the
Convention.2

36

Most courts agree that emotional injury is not

compensable in those cases where it has resulted only in physical manifestations such as weight loss or sleeplessness. At the
same time, most courts generally agree that emotional injury is
compensable if it proximately flows from a physical injury.
The troubling cases are those involving emotional injury accompanied by unrelated physical injury, i.e., where the physical
injury has not been shown to have caused the emotional injury.
These cases are typically resolved on a case-by-case basis. There
231 1 Lloyd's Rep. at 770 (citing Daddon v. Air France, 1 S.&B. Av. R. 141
(1984)).
232 Id. at 769.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 770.
235 Id.
236 See Floyd, 499 U.S. at 530; Rosman, 214 N.E.2d at 848; Fishman, 132 F.3d at
140; Croucher, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 501.
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is no consistent rule to guide the parties, although the trend in
the decisions seems to disfavor recovery for emotional injury
with unrelated physical harm. Thus, the case law suggests that a
plaintiff is more likely to prevail if he or she can allege and
prove a link between the physical and mental injuries.
In the future, certain advances in medicine may blur, or perhaps even clarify, the distinction between purely "physic" and
physical injury. Currently, the majority of courts have not accepted that PTSD alone can be characterized as a physical injury. Defendants should expect, however, even under the new
Montreal Convention of 1999, that plaintiffs will continue to
push the envelope with the backing of experts and application
of advances in science and medicine for more rulings to the effect that PTSD is itself a physical injury or l9sion corporelle. On
the other hand, although science may change or advance, the
analysis of facts in cases involving a claim of emotional injury is
unlikely to change significantly with the introduction of the
Montreal Convention. Accordingly, parties involved in future
cases with claims of mental injuries must be well-versed in the
body of case law cited in this paper. As discussed herein, the
application of the "lsion corporelle' concept in context of allegations of emotional harm is not entirely resolved and is an important area for development of the law in international air carrier
litigation.

